Anthropology of Political Organization

Books: Lens of Cultural Anthro and Gods of the Upper Air

Why does anthropology study politics at all, instead of leaving it to political science? In this 2022 Cultural Anthropology class on González chapter 9, “Politics and Power,” the answer runs from Thomas Hobbes’s “war of all against all” through the anthropological discovery that people organize themselves perfectly well without states — and lands on why the colonial-era obsession with cannibalism tells us far more about the accusers than the accused. (Page numbers refer to the first edition of Laura Tubelle de González, Through the Lens of Cultural Anthropology.)

Architecture: this page is the Cultural Anthropology 2022 class page for González chapter 9 (the anthropology of political organization). For the broader framework on why anthropology studies politics — Hobbes, Weber, and the state — see the concept canonical Why Does Anthropology Study Politics? For the deeper, source-based treatment of the cannibalism question, see Were Native Americans Cannibals? For David Graeber and David Wengrow’s rethinking of political typologies, see The Dawn of Everything. Hub routing: Power Analysis and Cross-Cultural Understanding.

📖 Book: Through the Lens of Cultural Anthropology (Commissions earned)

Key Concepts

  • Anthropology studies politics because the question of how people live in a “state of nature” versus in organized society is a deep philosophical concern in European and Euro-American thought, traceable to Thomas Hobbes (1651).
  • Hobbes argued that without a strong state — the Leviathan — human life would be “the war of everyone against everyone” and “nasty, brutish, and short,” a pessimism that still shapes contemporary arguments about crime and policing.
  • Societies debate which goods belong to the market sphere (privatized, competitive) and which belong to the state sphere (collectively provided) — water and health care are live examples of that contested boundary.
  • Labeling societies “stateless” or “uncentralized” treats European state institutions as the norm and marks other forms of organization by their supposed absence.
  • E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s study of the Nuer showed that lineage and kinship ties can organize people — including for anti-colonial resistance — without a centralized government, answering a puzzle that obsessed British colonial administrators.
  • Power takes two basic forms: coercive power (force and sanctions) and persuasive power (prestige and influence). The Melanesian “big man,” like Ongka in Ongka’s Big Moka, leads through persuasion because he has no coercive authority.
  • Social control operates through internalized controls (morality, conscience) and externalized controls or sanctions (fines, jail, and — as González notes — gossip, which is especially powerful in small communities).
  • The classic band–tribe–chiefdom typology is best treated as points on a continuum, not fixed stages; the categories were often hardened during colonialism as Europeans searched for “chiefs” to deal with, and the language (“pre-industrial,” “uncentralized”) smuggles in an assumption of inevitable progress toward the centralized state.
  • Max Weber defined the state as the human community that successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a territory; states pacify internal raids and feuds while reserving large-scale warfare to themselves.
  • The European “cannibal” accusation, originating with the Carib peoples at Spanish contact, was routinely exaggerated, mimed across language barriers, and strategically deployed — by accusers to justify conquest and by the accused to frighten enemies away — making colonial cannibalism accounts profoundly unreliable.

Standing Rock: Why Indigenous Politics Are Still Present

The class opened with a connection to the previous reading. Charles King’s chapter “Indian Country” featured Ella Cara Deloria, who was part of the Standing Rock reservation — and Standing Rock is exactly where González opens the politics chapter, with the Dakota Access Pipeline. There was a huge mobilization, a great deal of social media attention, and in the end it seems the pipeline went in anyway. The chapter uses the example to show how the different types of political organization bear on the question of how power prevails.

The point is that the issues of Indigenous Americans and Native peoples are still very much with us — in the pipeline fights, in the naming of places, in the baseball teams changing their names (the Cleveland Guardians, for one). People thought these issues would go away. They won’t.

Hobbes, the State of Nature, and the Market-vs-State Boundary

Why study politics in anthropology rather than political science? Because the underlying question — how people behave in a “state of nature” versus in organized society — is a philosophical preoccupation of European and Euro-American societies. Thomas Hobbes set the terms in 1651: in the state of nature, he wrote, life was a bellum omnium contra omnes, “the war of everyone against everyone,” and famously “nasty, brutish, and short.” Anthropologists have argued about hunter-gatherers against that baseline ever since.

The Hobbesian intuition still surfaces in everyday politics. The argument that without aggressive policing people will simply prey on one another is Hobbes’s Leviathan in modern dress: humans need a strong state to keep them in line, or they will be bad to each other. Interestingly, in economics the same “war of all against all” is recast as a virtue — through a misguided appropriation of Adam Smith’s invisible hand, self-interested competition in the market is supposed to work out to everyone’s benefit.

This sets up a recurring tension over which goods belong in the market sphere and which in the state sphere. Should water be privatized, or is it a human right the state should provide? Health care raises the identical question. These are not settled questions but ongoing debates about where the proper line between market competition and state provision should fall.

The “Stateless Society” Problem and Evans-Pritchard on the Nuer

Flowing from Hobbes is an assumption that European and North American institutions — the state, with its government, law, and politics — are the correct way to organize, and that peoples without those institutions are backwards, lacking, or strange. Hence the very vocabulary: a society is called “stateless,” defined by an absence. The same assumption animated the old confidence that a country could “spread democracy” by going to war — handing other people a political form they were presumed to lack.

When anthropologists arrived in such societies, the fascinating puzzle was how people organized themselves so effectively without a central government. Potlatches and leveling mechanisms coordinated large numbers of people economically with no central authority. And in colonial areas where people were resisting subjugation, the question became urgent: if a people had no state, how were they mobilizing to fight off the British?

E.E. Evans-Pritchard’s study of the Nuer is the classic answer. Lineages and patrilineal kinship ties, he showed, could organize people — including for resistance — without a state or government controlling them. The British were obsessed with this precisely because they were trying to colonize Nuer territory and meeting organized opposition. Evans-Pritchard’s account located political order in the kinship system itself, in the kind of structure that is hard to see from the outside but works, on close acquaintance, much like the institutions Europeans recognized as courts and law.

Coercive Power, Persuasive Power, and Ongka’s Big Moka

When most people think of power they think of the military — power backed by force. González calls this coercive power: obey, or something happens to you that you won’t like. But there is arguably a more interesting form, persuasive power, which works by convincing rather than compelling.

The Melanesian “big man” is the textbook case of persuasive power. In the ethnographic film Ongka’s Big Moka, Ongka travels around trying to persuade people to contribute pigs to a ceremonial exchange. The filmmakers stress that Ongka is a gifted persuader and speechmaker — but he has no coercive power. He cannot make anyone do anything. His authority is entirely a matter of prestige and persuasion.

Social Control: Internalized Controls, Sanctions, and Gossip

Closely related to persuasive power are social controls. Internalized controls are the standards people hold for themselves — morality, conscience, the sense that something is simply the right thing to do. Where these are shared and felt as natural, little persuading and no coercion are needed.

Externalized controls, or sanctions, work from outside: fines, jail, monetary penalties. González highlights one externalized control that anyone from a small town will recognize — gossip. The fear that an act will be heard about, repeated, and ruin one’s reputation is itself a powerful sanction, and it reinforces internalized controls at the same time.

In what González calls non-state societies, or uncentralized systems, these are the characteristic tools: organization through kinship or fictive-kin ties, reliance on internalized controls and gossip, informal leaders who may be temporary and called in to judge a particular matter rather than holding office for life, and structures like age sets, in which a generation — often the elder men — holds the authority to sanction others.

Bands, Tribes, Chiefdoms — and Why the Typology Is a Problem

González lays out the classic anthropological typology of non-state societies: bands (mostly hunting and gathering), tribes (mostly pastoral herding or small-scale agriculture), and chiefdoms (larger, intensive-agriculture units that begin to look centralized). The typology is famous in anthropology — and worth handling with care, for three reasons.

First, the terms carry meanings outside anthropology that distort them: most people assume tribes simply have chiefs, collapsing two of the categories into a stereotype. Second, the categories were frequently hardened during colonialism. Europeans arriving in other societies were always looking for a leader — “take me to your chief” — and would designate whoever was in charge at the moment as the permanent chief, converting temporary or situational authority into a fixed hierarchy. Much of what we picture as a “chief” comes from outsiders looking for leaders to negotiate with. Third, the vocabulary smuggles in inevitability. González notes on page 189 that chiefdoms are “pre-industrial” — but to call something pre-industrial implies it is on its way to becoming industrial; and “uncentralized” frames as a deficiency what is really just a different arrangement than the centralized state we tend to view positively.

The typology can still be used carefully if several points are kept in mind: these are not arrangements fixed for all time but, as González says, points on a continuum, with individuals and whole groups moving among them; all such societies interact, trade, and talk with one another; and no society today lives outside a state, since states have been spread across the entire world.

The Dawn of Everything: Rethinking the Typology

David Graeber and David Wengrow’s The Dawn of Everything: A New History of Humanity, then newly published, questions the whole bands-tribes-chiefdoms scheme. Two points stand out. First, human history has been marked by seasonality that the typology overlooks: the same people might gather in large, almost urban concentrations in one season and disperse into band-like groups in another. Second — and more radically — people over thousands of years have experimented with many kinds of social organization, and the archaeological record (their reinterpretation of Teotihuacan, which González also discusses, is a key case) suggests large-scale societies can exist without imposed centralization or stratification.

That is a substantial challenge, because most accounts — González’s included — assume that as societies grow they must become centralized and stratified, with someone ruling over them. The argument is developed at length in The Dawn of Everything course.

Weber’s State and the Monopoly on Legitimate Force

Turning to state societies — the centralized systems we know — González describes them as having a formalized central government with the authority to use force. The idea comes from the German sociologist Max Weber, in his lecture “Politics as a Vocation”: the state is “a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” The key word is legitimate: a state exists when people acknowledge that only the police or other agents of the state may rightfully use force.

This is why states work to suppress raids and feuds. Where a feud logic says “you killed my relative, so I will kill yours,” the state insists that injury be answered by the police, the courts, and the law rather than by retaliation. States pacify these internal conflicts — while reserving to themselves the large-scale warfare between states that, in the raid-and-feud world, did not take the form of devastating whole populations.

The European Cannibalism Obsession

The chapter’s “Food Matters: Cannibalism” box (page 206) is where this lecture does its most distinctive work. González notes that the Carib peoples of present-day Venezuela, Guyana, and the adjacent Caribbean islands — encountered by the Spanish at the start of European invasion — are the probable origin of the word “cannibal.” But the Spanish were arriving more than five hundred years ago and returning home with tales of man-eaters, and there is every reason not to trust them: declaring a people cannibals conveniently legitimizes conquering them, on the logic that without European rule they would simply be eating one another.

Cannibalism became a genuine European obsession. The point is not that cannibalism never occurred anywhere — in various forms it surely has — but that the accounts were heavily exaggerated and misinterpreted. Consider the practical problem: how do you even ask people whether they are cannibals without sharing a language? Miming the question is grotesque and easily misread — imagine being on the receiving end of that pantomime. And once a people grasped that Europeans were fixated on cannibalism, the accusation became a tool. Some, perhaps the Caribs, exaggerated their own fierceness to keep invaders away. Far more often, people deflected: “We don’t do that — but those people over there definitely do. Go after them.”

The King chapter read just before this one supplies a vivid case. George Hunt relayed to Franz Boas a chief’s report of a speech claiming the Kwakiutl ate the dead — an accusation rooted in a misread ceremony. The Cannibal Dance was in fact a performance warning against the dangers of cannibalism from within Kwakiutl society, but it was taken from the outside as proof that the Kwakiutl were cannibals. The lesson is to be deeply careful with these accounts: they served to justify conquest and to manipulate and frighten, and once one party is known to be obsessed with the subject, exaggeration follows. For the fuller, source-based treatment of the cannibalism question, see Were Native Americans Cannibals?

Montaigne, Carol Cohn, and the Limits of “Rational Discourse”

Not everyone in the age of conquest was a Hobbesian. Writing around 1580, Michel de Montaigne — who had not traveled to the Americas but wrote from accounts roughly a century old — produced his essay “On Cannibals.” From a European vantage, he conceded: “We are justified in calling these people barbarians by reference to the laws of reason.” That first clause sounds exactly like the standard European verdict. But Montaigne turned it: “but not in comparison with ourselves, who surpass them in every kind of barbarity.” Measured against our own ideals we might call others barbarians; measured against our actual conduct, Europeans exceeded the so-called cannibals in barbarity, and proved it repeatedly. Montaigne is often read as an early precursor to anthropology and to cultural relativism.

The thread connecting Montaigne’s “laws of reason” to the present is the anthropologist Carol Cohn’s work on how nuclear war is talked about. Cohn studied how missile designers and defense analysts described their weapons — how the language turned annihilation into abstractions and euphemisms, a push of a button delivering a “payload.” Immersed in that discourse, she found she could not voice an anti-war position from inside it; to do so was to be dismissed as a hippie or as simply ignorant. Her own values fell outside the bounds of what counted as “rational discourse” — a striking illustration of how the sanitizing of language shapes what can be said.

Bourdieu: Doxa and the Universe of the Undiscussed

The idea of “rational discourse” leads to the framework the lecture finds most useful for analyzing politics, drawn from Pierre Bourdieu (who appears not in this chapter but in earlier discussions of social capital). Bourdieu distinguishes the universe of discourse or debate — the realm of opinion, where an orthodox and a heterodox position contend, left against right — from the underlying universe of the undiscussed, what he calls doxa: the shared premises everyone simply accepts and no one argues about. What looks like a debate rests on a foundation of assumptions that are not themselves up for debate.

Same-sex marriage is a useful illustration of how issues move between these realms. In the 1950s it sat in the universe of the undiscussed — not contested, simply unthought. Through the 1980s and 1990s it entered the realm of debate, orthodoxy against heterodoxy. For much of the present generation it then passed back toward the undiscussed, assumed rather than argued — though it may now be moving back into dispute. The exercise Bourdieu’s framework invites is to ask, of any issue: is this part of the undiscussed? What makes it debatable at all, and what kind of debate are we actually having?


Frequently Asked Questions

Why does anthropology study politics instead of leaving it to political science?
Because the framing question — how people behave in a “state of nature” versus in organized society — is a deep philosophical concern in European and Euro-American thought, running from Thomas Hobbes (1651) onward. Anthropology brings to it the comparative evidence of how people actually organize power across very different societies, including those without states.

What is the difference between coercive and persuasive power?
Coercive power rests on force and sanctions — obey or face a penalty. Persuasive power works through prestige and the ability to convince. The Melanesian “big man,” such as Ongka in Ongka’s Big Moka, exemplifies persuasive power: he leads by persuasion because he has no coercive authority over others.

What does it mean to call a society “stateless” or “uncentralized,” and what’s the problem with it?
These terms describe societies organized without a centralized state government, often through kinship, informal leadership, and social controls like gossip. The problem is that they define such societies by an absence, treating the European state as the norm and implying — through words like “pre-industrial” — an inevitable progression toward centralization.

How did Weber define the state?
Max Weber, in “Politics as a Vocation,” defined the state as the human community that successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a territory. On this view a state exists when people accept that only its agents may rightfully use force, which is why states suppress private raids and feuds.

Why should we be skeptical of colonial accounts of cannibalism?
Because the accusation was useful to everyone except the accused. Europeans used it to justify conquest; accused peoples sometimes exaggerated it to frighten invaders away or deflected it onto neighbors. The question was often mimed across language barriers and badly misread — as with the Kwakiutl Cannibal Dance, which warned against cannibalism but was taken as evidence of it. The accounts say more about the accusers than the accused.


Course Navigation

This 2022 discussion of “Politics and Power” uses González chapter 9 (first edition) from Through the Lens of Cultural Anthropology. (Commissions earned)

Previous class: People Before Data: Ella Cara Deloria